We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the "paradox of voting" in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the adoption of a "smooth" policy rule under which the degree to which parties favor their own interests is increasing in their margin of victory. In other words, mandates matter. We argue that this approach is an improvement over the existing literature as it is consistent with the empirical evidence. Incorporating this policy rule into a costly voting model with paternalistic voters yields a parsimonious model with attractive properties. Specifically, the model predicts that when the size of the electorate grows without bound, limiting turnout is strictly positive both in terms of numbers and proportions. Further, the model preserves the typical comparative statics predictions that have been identified in the extant costly voting models such as the underdog effect and the competition effect. Finally, under the case of selfish agents, we are able to extend Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1985) zero turnout result to a general class of smooth policy rules. Thus, this new approach reconciles the predictions of standard costly voting, both in terms of positive turnout and comparative statics predictions with the assumption of a large electorate environment.
Introduction
In the original formulation of his rational choice theory, Anthony Downs (1957) drew attention to what has come to be known as the "paradox of voting": if voting is costly, turnout in large elections should be negligible. Downs formulated the problem in a decision theoretic framework, relying on the fact that the probability of being pivotal is exogenous. Ledyard (1981 Ledyard ( , 1984 and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) questioned the validity of this approach and recast the problem in game theoretic terms. As a result of these efforts, in their 1985 paper, Palfrey and Rosenthal demonstrated that in large electorates, provided uncertainty about relative costs, voters with positive net voting costs abstain even in a game theoretic framework: "We have come full circle and are once again beset by the paradox of not voting."
1 (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985, p. 64) . In spite of this paradox, game theoretic costly voting models have been, and continue to be, prominent (see, for instance, Campbell, 1999; Börgers, 2004; Goeree and Grosser, 2007; Krasa and Polborn, 2009; Krishna and Morgan, 2010; Taylor and Yildirim 2010, among others) . Their popularity is driven by two factors: first, these models are consistent with the notion that voters behave strategically (e.g. Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Franklin et al., 1994) ; second, they are able to generate intuitive, and empirically supported, comparative statics predictions (e.g. Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999; Blais, 2000; Levine and Palfrey, 2007) -at least with a finite electorate.
To date, the prediction that turnout converges to zero as the size of the electorate grows has 1 Curiously, the literature has referred to this notion as both the "paradox of voting" and the "paradox of not voting".
typically been overcome in the costly voting model through the incorporation of either ad hoc preferences for voting or coordination mechanisms that lack a solid micro-foundation (see for instance Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Harsanyi, 1977 Harsanyi, , 1992 Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006; Coate and Conlin, 2004 ) . We instead propose a new approach to modeling large elections that overcomes this paradox in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of direct psychic rewards from casting one's ballot.
We consider a two-party system. Citizens are characterized by their political preference and cost of voting, both being private information. We modify the standard model in two ways. First, we drop the usual winner-take-all assumption and instead include a "smooth" policy rule under which the degree to which parties (or elected officials) favor their own party's interests is increasing in their margin of victory. In other words, mandates matter. Specifically, we assume that the benefit from government action is distributed across members of the two parties according to a continuous function that is strictly increasing (tilted toward members of the winning party) in the proportion of votes received by the winning party. Thus, politicians are "smooth" in the sense that, for members of a given party, benefits are strictly increasing in the vote percentage received by said party.
Second, following in the tradition of recent work by Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) , we assume that voters are paternalistic. Citizens not only receive a private benefit from having their preferred policies adopted, but they also receive spillover benefits from the impact that these policies have on other individuals.
To motivate our assumption about smooth politicians, we first argue that this is a logical expectation in an environment where candidates serve at the will of their electorate. We additionally provide empirical evidence of this type of behavior in the U.S. Congress. In particular, we use a panel data model with member and Congress fixed effects to demonstrate that the degree to which members of congress adopt partisan voting records is increasing in the margin of victory in their most recent election.
Using our proposed theoretical framework we show that, when the size of the electorate grows without bound, limiting turnout is strictly positive (in terms of proportion) if the supporters of both parties are paternalistic. This relies critically on the assumption that mandates matter.
Indeed, we show that if the election is decided by winner-take-all majority rule, turnout still converges to zero even if voters are paternalistic. The intuition is as follows. For a paternalistic individual in a winner-take-all election, while the benefit from voting increases with the size of the population, her probability of being pivotal goes to zero at an even faster rate. While, under the marriage of paternalism and a smooth policy function, the rate at which policy impact decreases with population is such that it is precisely offset by the increase in paternalistic benefits arising from the increase in the population. Conversely, when we relax the paternalism assumption and assume that the supporters of at least one party are purely selfish, we are able to extend Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1985) famous zero turnout result to a general class of smooth policy rules. Thus, we require both paternalism and the assumption that mandates matter to overcome the paradox of voting.
In analyzing the comparative statics properties of our model, we distinguish between two different types of paternalism: Exclusive and Inclusive Paternalism. While Exclusive agents are solely concerned about members of their own party, Inclusive voters also care about the supporters of the other party. Under this dichotomy, our framework allows us to discern between two competing comparative statics effects associated with the relative size of the two parties. On the one hand, increasing the size of one party makes its supporters less likely to vote (the well-known free-riding effect). On the other hand, changing the relative composition of the electorate varies the spillovers received by a voter. We refer to this second channel of impact as the spillover effect. While free-riding and spillover effects perfectly offset each other in the case of Exclusive voters, the latter is less pronounced when voters are Inclusive. As a consequence, when agents display Inclusive Paternalism, under the assumption of identical cost distributions and identical overall levels of paternalism, the incentive to free-ride leads members of the minority party to turn out to vote at higher rates than do the majority (the so-called underdog effect --see Levine and Palfrey, 2007) ; nevertheless, the majority never loses its initial advantage and receives a higher share of the votes. Furthermore, assuming the same cost distribution for both parties and symmetric paternalism, the model generates the prediction that the closer the election the higher turnout (the so-called competition effect--see Levine and Palfrey, 2007) . Both the underdog and competition effects have been well documented empirically (see, for instance, Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999; Blais, 2000; Levine and Palfrey, 2007) and characterized as theoretical features of standard costly voting models with finite electorate and identical cost distributions (see Taylor and Yildirim, 2010) . Key however, as shown by Taylor and Yildirim (2010) , is the fact that these effects disappear when the electorate size grows without bound.
Thus, a main contribution of our approach is its ability to reconcile the attractive properties of standard costly voting models of small elections with the assumption of a large electorate environment.
Background and Motivation
The first attempt to solve the paradox of voting in costly elections relied on the assumption that citizens receive a direct benefit from voting that is independent of the election outcome. When this benefit exceeds the cost of voting ( > ) citizens vote (see Riker and Ordeshook, 1968) .
While overcoming the problem of zero turnout, this model abstracts from strategic interactions and provides no comparative statics predictions regarding voter turnout. Other scholars approached the problem from a different perspective, assuming instead that leaders can mobilize party supporters (e.g. Morton, 1991; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999) . As a consequence, the game becomes one with a small number of players and equilibrium turnout is positive. Although they are able to provide comparative statics results, such models do not provide a micro-foundation to explain how leaders mobilize followers. Ordeshook is replaced by an endogenously determined group-specific utilitarian voting rule that accounts for the benefits and voting costs of all individuals.
In the model of Feddersen and Sandroni, within each of two types (parties) there are two kinds of agents: ethical voters and abstainers, with the latter abstaining under all circumstances. Ethical voters on the other hand receive a benefit D greater than the maximum voting cost ̅ for "doing their part", where "doing their part" consists of following the threshold voting strategy that would be adopted by a social planner maximizing a utilitarian social welfare function. The social planner's objective function adopted by a given type (party) puts equal weight on the benefits and voting costs of members of each type (party). Hence, ethical voters exhibit otherregarding preferences: while they are altruistic with regards to other voters' costs, their specification is paternalistic in that an individual of a given type projects her own preferred election outcome onto the entire measure of voters.
Feddersen and Sandroni's model provides a strong set of comparative statics predictions and represents a major step forward in the quest for an appropriate theory of large elections. A version of their specification is also used by Coate and Conlin (2004) In this paper we take a different approach to the problem. Building on the classic work of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) , we extend their specification to include the paternalistic behavior posited by those working in the tradition of Feddersen and Sandroni. Additionally, critical to our approach is the assumption that mandates matter and election outcomes are mapped into policy decisions through a smooth policy function that is continuous in election margins (smooth politicians).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We begin, in Section 3, with the case for replacing traditional winner-take-all models of election outcomes with our proposed smooth policy approach. In Section 4, assuming smooth politicians, we construct a parsimonious and tractable model that yields positive turnout when voters are paternalistic, while we extend Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1985) zero turnout result to a general class of smooth policy rules when the supporters of at least one party are purely selfish. Section 5 provides comparative statics predictions: we show that, under the assumption of identical cost distributions, our model generates both the underdog effect and the competition effect. Section 6 concludes.
Smooth Politicians: Empirical Evidence
The key innovation of our modeling approach is the incorporation of a smooth policy rule under which the degree of partisanship following an election is a continuous function of the relative 1998, finds that parties respond to declining vote shares by changing the policies they support.
Finally, Peterson et al. (2003) analyze newspaper coverage to identify U.S. Presidential and offyear elections that were perceived as providing a "mandate" to the winning party. They then provide empirical evidence that, following a "mandate" election, members of congress deviate from their historical voting pattern in the direction of the mandate -with this effect attenuating over time.
While this extant literature is suggestive of smooth behavior by politicians, more direct evidence can be obtained through an analysis of congressional voting behavior. their candidate's loss margin) because the selection mechanism would in the long-run lead to preferred policy outcomes. While such a direct causal link is not necessary to motivate the assumption of smooth politicians, it is possible to use the panel nature of the congressional data to test for a more causal link. Specifically, by pooling the data and including candidate and congress fixed effects, we can more directly evaluate the way that the voting behavior of a given candidate evolves over time in response to changes in their margin of victory. The final column of Table 1 reports the results from this analysis. Again, margin of victory is highly significant, and the estimated marginal effect is .12. Thus, even when we focus solely on the within candidate variation in ideological voting patterns, there is clear evidence in support of the smooth politician assumption.
To incorporate the notion of smooth politicians in the context of a costly voting model, we assume that policy outcomes can be mapped to the interval (0,1). Members of party A strictly prefer outcomes closer to 0 and members of party B strictly prefer outcomes closer to 1.
Election outcomes (expressed as the proportion voting for party B) are mapped into policy outcomes via a policy function (•). The only restrictions on the policy function are that it be strictly increasing in the proportion of votes for party B and that there is symmetric treatment of the two parties. 4 This specification provides a great deal of flexibility; as is shown in Figure 1 , which presents 3 different possible policy functions. The solid line presents a "proportional" policy function which is consistent with the proportional representation rules that operate in many parliamentary democracies. The dashed line represents a "quasi-majority" policy function which approximates policy outcomes under direct election regimes such as those that operate in the U.S. Congress. Our model allows such a "quasi-majority" policy function to be arbitrarily close to the type of step function that characterizes the winner-take-all assumption that has been typical in costly voting models.
Figure 1.
Lastly, the dotted line represents an "un-conventional" policy rule that, while likely of little empirical relevance, is still admitted by the model.
We conclude this section by noting that our goal is not to provide a theoretical treatment that explains why politicians are smooth but rather we seek to show how incorporating this type observed behavior into the costly voting framework yields attractive theoretical results.
The Model
We consider a model of costly voting with two parties: . Society is composed of citizens. Each individual has the same ex ante independent probability ∈ (0,1) of being a supporter of party and 1 − of supporting party . Citizens decide simultaneously whether to vote or to abstain. If they decide to participate in the election they bear a cost. We assume that for a generic individual , supporter of party , there is a cost to voting ∈ ∈ � , � ⊂ ℝ + .
Members of party draw their voting costs independently from the differentiable distribution Individuals receive direct benefits from government allocations, but they also exhibit paternalism. They receive spillovers from the benefits obtained by the other members of their party and may enjoy positive utility from each member of the other party being subject to their own party's policy. If a supporter of party receives a direct benefit from government action, she enjoys an additional benefit equal to for each member of her own party, and a benefit � for every supporter of the alternative party. We assume that and � are common knowledge and that , � ≥ 0.
Consider individual , with cost , belonging to party . Let and be the number of supporters of party and of votes cast for , both exclusive of individual , respectively.
Moreover, call � the number of votes cast for the other party. Notice that for a supporter of party voting for the other party is dominated by abstaining, hence citizens' actions boil down to abstain or vote for their preferred alternative. If individual decides to abstain her benefit is given by:
If decides to vote, she receives a gross benefit equal to:
� if + � > 0, and
and pays the cost . Therefore, 's net benefit from voting is given by:
The solution concept that we employ is Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE). As it is customary in this literature, we restrict our attention to type-symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria, in the sense that all citizens supporting the same alternative choose the same strategy. In turn, participation decisions depend on the realization of the individual voting cost. Formally, a strategy is a mapping : � , � → {0,1}, where ( ) = 0 means that individual i supporting party abstains and votes otherwise. A strategy profile { , } is a type-symmetric BNE of the game if ( ) maximizes every individual's expected payoff, given that all other individuals adhere to .
We start by exploring voters' behavior when + 1 is finite. It is possible to characterize citizens' strategies through cut-off values * such that 
Notice that the expectation in equation (2) The following proposition summarizes the main result of the paper. 
Equilibrium Analysis: Exclusive vs Inclusive Paternalism
We now focus on large elections where limiting turnout is positive, that is Γ A , Γ B > 0. We consider two different types of paternalistic voters. If members of party are such that > 0, while = 0, we will say that they are Exclusive, as they only care about the members of their own party. On the other hand, we will call them Inclusive if , > 0. We limit our analysis to the cases where all citizens are either Exclusive or Inclusive. 6 We begin by presenting the following lemma. is unchanged. As a consequence, the equilibrium thresholds for the two parties move in the same direction. If voters are Inclusive the spillover effect is less pronounced. Following an increase in , an -supporter receives higher 6 Given some additional conditions, most results also hold when the supporters of one party are Exclusive, while the members of the other party are Inclusive. However, the study of the "mixed" case would complicate the analysis without adding any interesting insights. Similarly, the key results do not greatly change if decreases with , implying that the equilibrium threshold for party cannot increase while the equilibrium threshold for decreases.
Lemma 1

If voters are Exclusive then
Lemma 1 allows us to establish the following result. Thus, under Exclusive Paternalism, the free-riding effect is offset by the spillover effect and voter turnout goes to zero as goes to zero. Conversely, under Inclusive Paternalism, the free-riding effect dominates and as goes to zero, minority turnout goes to 100% and majority turnout goes to zero.
Proposition 3 i. If voters are Exclusive then
Identical Cost Distributions
In the remainder of the paper we focus on the case where all citizens draw their costs from the same cost distribution, i.e. we assume = = . Proposition 4 establishes that if voters are
Exclusive the group with the higher degree of paternalism will always vote more often than the other, while the same relative percentage will cast a ballot when = .
Proposition 4 Suppose Exclusive voters and = .
i.
On the other hand, Proposition 5 demonstrates that if voters are Inclusive, there exists a critical value ̃ such that -supporters vote more often than -supporters for any <̃, while the opposite is true when >̃. 
Proposition 5 (Underdog Effect) Suppose Inclusive voters and
(Asymmetric Underdog Effect).
The value of ̃ depends on the relative degree of paternalism of the two groups. If both groups exhibit the same overall level of Inclusive paternalism then ̃= 1 2 , meaning that the minority supporters vote with a strictly higher probability than do the members of the majority party. This phenomenon, called underdog effect 7 , has been discussed in several papers and has been formalized in a general framework by Taylor and Yildirim (2010) for the case of small electorate and same cost distribution. Crucially, in Taylor and Yildirim's model the underdog effect disappears when → ∞, as turnout converges to zero.
The underdog effect is caused by the relatively higher incentive to free-ride experienced by the majority supporters. This is why it arises only when voters are Inclusive. As shown in Lemma 1, if voters are Exclusive the spillover effect is sufficiently strong to offset the free-riding effect, and the equilibrium thresholds of the two groups move in the same direction when changes.
Moreover, notice that the underdog effect can only arise if both groups display the same overall level of paternalism, that is if + = + . If that is not the case, the game is no longer symmetric, implying that one group votes with a strictly higher probability when the electorate is evenly split. Hence, the switching point ̃ cannot be equal to . Thus, we draw a distinction between a pure underdog effect and an asymmetric underdog effect.
When both groups are characterized by the same overall level of paternalism, despite the underdog effect, the majority supporters never lose their initial advantage, provided that individuals care about their fellow group members at least as much as do those supporting the alternative party. As shown by Taylor and Yildirim (2010) for the small electorate case, in equilibrium the majority party receives a higher share of the votes. As we prove in the next proposition, this is also true when voters are Exclusive. as the 7 The term underdog effect was introduced by Levine and Palfrey (2007) , who document it with experimental evidence. Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) and Blais (2000) , among others, provide empirical evidence for the case of large elections. 8 Supposing that an individual is at least as much concerned for her own group as is a member of the other party is a realistic, and not very restrictive, assumption. Moreover, by definition, it is always true for Exclusive voters.
share of the votes cast for party in equilibrium. Another important phenomenon that has received significant attention in the voting literature is the so-called competition effect, which states that turnout is higher the closer is the election.
Proposition 6 Suppose that
Levine and Palfrey (2007), who coined the term competition effect, provide evidence for it from laboratory experiments. This has been a difficult property to demonstrate in models of large elections (see Krasa and Polborn, 2009) . Indeed, as reported by Taylor and Yildirim "the widely held intuition that elections with a more evenly split electorate should generate a greater expected turnout appears to be a property of small elections" (Taylor and Yildirim, 2010, p. 464) . Nevertheless, the reason why their model does not predict higher turnout in closer elections is because in a standard costly voting framework turnout tends to zero as → ∞. Yet, the competition effect is well documented in large elections (see, for example, Blais, 2000; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999) .
In Proposition 7 we provide analytical evidence of the competition effect for the case of Exclusive voters, provided the following two conditions hold: = and ′′ ( ) ≥ 0 for
). Both conditions are rather weak and intuitive.
Firstly, if ≠ the game is asymmetric and turnout for the two parties is not the same when , an individual vote has more (or equal) weight, and the benefit from voting is greater (or equal), when it closes the gap with the other party than when it increases it. This assumption encompasses both the proportional and quasi-majority policy rules discussed above in Section 3. Propositions 2 thru 7 and their associated lemmas and corollaries serve to highlight the large election properties of a costly voting model that incorporates paternalism (Exclusive and Inclusive) and smooth politicians -the key strength of the model being its ability to overcome the paradox of voting, and to capture free-riding and spillover effects, the underdog effect, and the competition effect in a purely game theoretic formulation of a large election. The above proposition tells us that if the election is decided by majority rule then, even with paternalistic voters, turnout converges to zero, unless the electorate is evenly split, in which case everyone votes. Interestingly, Evren (2010) obtains the same result in a model in which a part of the electorate has other-regarding preferences, under the assumption that their proportion is known. Proposition 8 highlights the necessity of assuming a smooth policy rule in our framework in order to overcome the paradox of voting in a general sense, that is for any possible composition of the electorate. The intuition is that, under majority rule, if the electorate is unevenly split the higher benefit of voting that a paternalistic individual enjoys in a larger population is dominated by the lower probability of being pivotal, with the latter going to zero faster then goes to infinity.
Proposition 7 (Competition Effect
)
Discussion and Conclusion
Since the seminal work of Ledyard (1981 Ledyard ( , 1984 and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) , economists have commonly modeled elections as participation games where voters pay a cost to vote. The prominence of such models can be explained by their game theoretic micro foundations, and their ability to generate predictions which are consistent with notions of strategic voting behavior and the comparative statics results that have been documented in empirical studies of election outcomes. While popular, current formulations of the costly voting model typically confront one major drawback -the paradox of voting which was first described in decision theoretic terms by Anthony Downs (1957) .
Several attempts have been made to solve the paradox (see Feddersen, 2004 , for a review) and thus reconcile costly voting models with the evidence that a substantial fraction of the population turns out to vote. Among all of these approaches, Feddersen and Sandroni's work is perhaps the most successful example. Unfortunately, while their framework yields strong comparative statics predictions and positive turnout, their model is inherently non-strategic with regards to members of the same party.
In this paper we approach the problem from a different perspective, developing a parsimonious game theoretic model that builds on the basic framework of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) . We extend their analysis in two ways. Our primary innovation is the adoption of a smooth politician framework under which election outcomes are mapped into policy decisions through a policy function that is continuous in election margins. Second, similar in some ways to the work of Feddersen and Sandroni, we assume paternalistic voters. Under this new model, when citizens are paternalistic, large elections yield strictly positive turnout both in terms of numbers and proportions. Conversely, the model predicts that, if the supporters of at least one party are purely selfish, turnout will converge to zero as the electorate grows; thus, we extend Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1985) theorem to a general class of smooth policy functions. A similar result holds for the case of paternalism & majority rule. Indeed, under the winner-take-all assumption, if the electorate is unevenly split, turnout converges to zero -even when voters are paternalistic, while everyone votes if the electorate is evenly split. Finally, our framework yields sensible comparative statics predictions, namely the underdog and competition effect, that were believed to be only properties of small elections (see Taylor and Yildirim, 2010) .
Thus, our analysis demonstrates that by reconceptualizing a paternalistic model of costly voting to incorporate a smooth policy function -an arguably more realistic description of the policy process -it is possible to reconcile the small sample predictions of the costly voting framework with a game theoretic large electorate environment.
Finally, we note that in a concurrent working paper, Evren (2010) also overcomes the paradox of voting in a costly voting framework. Similar to the model of Feddersen and Sandroni, Evren assumes altruistic voters and a winner-take-all election. Evren's definition of altruism partially corresponds to our notion of paternalism, in that a voter does not incorporate other individuals' benefits in her own utility function (as altruism is typically understood), but rather projects her own preference onto other citizens; he also assumes, though, that individuals care about the voting costs of others, thus following in the spirit of Feddersen and Sandroni. In this framework, Evren shows that, if there is uncertainty about the proportion of the population who are altruistic voters, the rule utilitarian assumption is not necessary to generate positive turnout in large elections.
It is an open question about which assumption is a more appropriate description of the driving force behind voter behavior: expectations regarding the importance of mandate or uncertainty regarding the composition of the electorate. We consider Evren's paper and ours to be complements and view an exploration of their relative merits as fertile ground for future research.
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose citizens play according to the strategy defined by (1) and thresholds ̂ and ̂. Then for a supporter of party the expected gross benefit from voting is given by . If * ∈ � , �, then all supporters of party with cost less than * will vote and those with higher costs will abstain. Similarly, if * = all members of party will abstain, while if * = they will all vote.∎
Proof of Proposition 2
In order to evaluate the limit of Equation (2), we must consider two cases.
i) In the first case, suppose that * = and * = , implying that = = 0. Here, all other citizens choose not to vote with probability 1. As a result, the returns to voting for a supporter of party are given by:
Given that ̂→ , in the limit, as → ∞, then Γ � converges to Γ . Hence the returns to voting become infinite if Γ > 0, while they are equal to . On the other hand, if at least one between Γ and Γ is strictly positive, then it cannot be the case that * = and * = in equilibrium.
ii) In the second case, suppose * > for at least for one party. As a result, for at least one type the probability of voting is strictly positive, which translates into + > 0. We begin by
showing that for this case the Plim of the second term in Equation (2) is zero and can thus be ignored. To see this, first note that the second half of this term is the probability that no one votes. Following the approach taken by Taylor and Yildirim (2010) it is easy to show that the limiting marginal distributions of �̂̂,̂�1 −̂� � are independent Poisson distributions with means equal to { , (1 − ) }. We now turn to the first term in Equation (2). For simplicity of notation let us define
We can re-write the expression over which we are taking the expectation as:
Recall that, by construction, this term is limited to outcomes where ̂̂+̂�1 −̂� > 0.
Moreover, notice that, by definition:
Thus we have the result of Equation (A1). 
Recall that the ̂= , ̂̂= and ̂�1 −̂� = (1 − ). This fact, combined with the result that the second term of Equation (2) converges to zero, implies that, conditional on ̂̂+̂�1 −̂� > 0, in the limit Equation (2) collapses to
Finally, recalling that in equilibrium individuals use a threshold voting strategy, the probability that a member of the generic party votes is equal to ( * ). Hence, we can re-write the limiting benefit for -members as
The limiting benefit for -members can be calculated in an analogous way and is equal to
This implies that, in equilibrium, we have * = Γ ( * )(1− )
and
Suppose Γ , Γ > 0. We are going to show that equilibrium turnout is bounded away from zero.
Notice first that, by definition,
Therefore, from equations (A4) and (A5) we know that, in equilibrium, the following holds * 
From (A6) it follows that * * > 0 and, as a consequence, there exists a function such that * = ( * ) and
Suppose that * → when → ∞. This implies that, at the limit, the benefit from voting for an -member is less than or equal to . Notice from (A2) that, since and equation (A6) implies that * goes to as * goes to , it must be the case that:
Working with Equation (A3), by similar logic, as * goes to the benefit from voting for a Bmember tends to:
Note that, if the condition outlined in (A7) holds, it must be the case that � ( * )� goes to zero faster than ( * ). However, this implies that expression (A8) tends to infinity and thus eachsupporter votes in equilibrium. Analogously, it can be shown that if * → then the benefit from voting for an -member tends to infinity, proving that turnout is bounded away from zero in equilibrium. Moreover, notice from (A6) that if * > then * > , and vice versa, which means that in equilibrium turnout is positive for both parties.
Finally, suppose Γ = 0. In this case, the limiting benefit from voting for a member of party is equal to zero, which means that * cannot be greater than when → ∞. This in turns implies that the benefit from voting for a member of party tends to zero, even if Γ > 0, and as a consequence * → . Therefore, unless both Γ and Γ are strictly positive, equilibrium turnout is either zero, if Γ = Γ = 0, ≥ , or converges to zero otherwise. ∎
Proof of Corollary 1
This result follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 2. ∎
Proof of Lemma 1
From (A6) we calculate
The above expression reduces to
From (A9) The left hand side of the above inequality would be positive, while the right hand side would be negative, which cannot be. ∎
Proof of Proposition 3
i. We know from Proposition 2 that * [ ( = . This, together with (A12), implies that lim →0 ( * ) = lim →0 ( * ) = 0. Similarly, given (A13), we conclude that lim →1 ( * ) = lim →1 ( * ) = 0.
ii. If voters are Inclusive, the benefit for an -member converges to 
Proof of Proposition 5
Given Proposition 3, we know that, by continuity, there must exist at least one value ̃ such that * �̃� = * �̃�. Moreover, we know from Lemma 1 that � * � * � * � * � � < 0 and, therefore, when * = * it must be the case that * > * . However, if there were more than one crossing point, it would imply * < * for at least one of these points, which cannot be. This proves that there exists a unique ̃ such that * �̃� = * �̃�, * ( ) > * ( )∀ <̃ and * ( ) < * ( )∀ >̃. 
Proof of Proposition 7
Notice that 
We know from Proposition 4 that * ( ) = * ( )∀ . Together with Lemma 1, this implies that * = *
. Therefore, (A15) reduces to ( * ) * * , implying that the sign of .∎
Proof of Proposition 8
Consider a sequence ( ) such that all the properties of (•) hold for any and, moreover, 
From Proposition 6 we know that in equilibrium the share of the votes for the two parties will only be equal when = 
